The days of expecting a comprehensive U.S.–China trade deal are over. What's replacing them is something more calculated, more durable, and more consequential for importers: a framework of "managed trade" that selectively reduces barriers on low-risk goods while keeping structural tariff pressure firmly in place.
USTR Jamieson Greer made this explicit at a Council on Foreign Relations event on May 26, 2026. When asked what the U.S. gained from the Trump–Xi Beijing summit, his response was blunt: "I get to keep tariffs on China, which is pretty awesome."
Here's what B2B importers need to understand about the new landscape — and how to position for it.
The current U.S. tariff regime on Chinese imports is built on three legal pillars, each with different timelines and implications:
| Layer | Legal Basis | Rate | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline MFN tariffs | WTO commitments | 3–7% (avg) | Permanent |
| Section 301 tariffs | Trade Act of 1974 | 7.5–100% (varies) | Active; new investigation underway |
| Section 122 global tariff | Trade Act of 1974 | 10% blanket | Expires ~July 24, 2026 |
After the U.S. Supreme Court struck down IEEPA-based tariffs in early 2026, the effective weighted-average tariff rate on Chinese goods settled at approximately 21.6% — down from the February peak but far above historical norms. The theoretical rate sits even higher at ~37.5%.
Section 122 authorizes the president to impose tariffs of up to 15% for 150 days without congressional approval. The current 10% global tariff under this authority is set to expire in late July 2026.
Greer hinted that the administration may invoke Section 122 again, arguing that "it is hard to imagine that Congress intended to limit the use of Section 122 to only once per presidential term." However, the U.S. Court of International Trade already ruled Section 122 tariffs illegal on May 7, 2026, and while the Federal Circuit has temporarily stayed that ruling, the legal foundation is shaky.
The more likely path: the administration lets Section 122 expire and transitions tariff authority to Section 301, where a formal investigation is already underway and expected to produce findings by late summer 2026.
The most concrete outcome of the May 14–15 Trump–Xi summit is the establishment of a U.S.–China Board of Trade, a joint consultative body tasked with identifying roughly $30 billion in non-sensitive goods eligible for tariff reduction on each side.
Based on USTR statements and Chinese analyst reports, the categories most likely to qualify include:
Categories explicitly excluded from any relief:
Key takeaway: If you import goods in the likely qualifying categories, now is the time to prepare your public comment submission. The comment window will be brief, and well-documented input from actual importers carries significant weight.
Greer's framing leaves no room for misinterpretation: U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods will "likely always be higher than for other countries." The Board of Trade is not a pathway to normalization — it's a pressure-release valve.
China's share of U.S. imports has fallen from over 21% in 2017 to under 10% by late 2025. Greer confirmed that tariff reductions on non-sensitive goods "would not result in supply chains returning to China." The policy objective is clear: maintain a tariff disadvantage sufficient to encourage sourcing from Mexico, Vietnam, India, and other alternatives.
The Chinese yuan has appreciated against the dollar in recent months, naturally eroding some of China's price competitiveness. This means even a modest tariff reduction on qualifying goods may not produce significant cost savings for importers — the currency effect offsets much of the benefit.
The targeted goods represent approximately 9% of U.S. imports from China in 2025 and less than 1% of total U.S. imports. This is managed trade at the margins, not a fundamental shift.
The ongoing Section 301 investigation into China's trade practices (covering technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation) will produce findings that could trigger additional tariffs or quotas. Importers should not assume the current rate environment is the ceiling.
The U.S. isn't acting in isolation. On May 22, 2026, the European Parliament approved a new steel safeguard framework with 606 votes in favor, replacing measures in place since 2018.
Key provisions:
The EU, U.S., and Mexico are all moving in the same direction: layered trade barriers that protect domestic industries while maintaining selective market access. For B2B importers operating across multiple regions, this means a world of increasingly divergent compliance requirements.
| Action | Priority | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Identify which of your product categories fall under "non-sensitive" classification | High | Before Federal Register notice |
| Prepare data-backed public comment submission for USTR | High | Within comment period (likely 30 days) |
| Model cost scenarios: current tariff vs. reduced tariff vs. alternative sourcing | Medium | Ongoing |
| Monitor Section 301 investigation progress | Medium | July–September 2026 |
| Diversify at least 20% of volume to non-China sources | Strategic | 6–12 months |
The managed trade framework disproportionately advantages large companies with compliance teams and lobbying capacity. Small importers should:
The U.S.–China trade relationship has entered a phase of managed competition with controlled engagement. The $30 billion Board of Trade framework is real, but it's designed to be limited. Tariffs on China will remain elevated, Section 301 is building toward new actions, and supply chain diversification is explicit U.S. policy.
For importers, the actionable insight is this: don't wait for a grand bargain that isn't coming. Instead, focus on the narrow but real opportunities within the managed trade framework — starting with the public comment process — while continuing to build supply chain resilience outside China.
The new normal isn't free trade or trade war. It's something in between, and it requires a more sophisticated, more proactive approach to sourcing strategy.
Sources: USTR Jamieson Greer CFR remarks (May 26, 2026); Reuters; Wall Street Journal; Bloomberg News; European Parliament press release (May 22, 2026); Zhongtai Securities Research (May 25, 2026); U.S. Federal Register; DailyAlpha analysis